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On the Conditions of the Ethical Becoming of the Self: Sensibility, 
Enjoyment and Displaced Subjectivity
Irina・Poleshchuk
Abstract:・At・ the・center・of・ this・paper・ is・ an・analysis・of・ sensible・ subjectivity,・ as・
it・ is・ formed・and・deepened・ in・ enjoyment,・ and・before・ it・ enters・ into・ an・ethical・
intersubjective・relation・with・the・other・person.・I・address・the・philosophy・of・Emmanuel・






with・ transcendence.・This・ leads・ to・a・discussion・of・ the・ inevitability・of・ the・ethical・
becoming・of・the・self.・From・hunger・and・the・satisfaction・of・needs・the・self・moves・to・
a・joy・of・taste:・tasting・bread,・and・the・taste・of・the・materiality・of・life,・but・also・bathing・
in・the・materiality・of・objects・ through・vision・and・light.・ ・ I・will・demonstrate・that・ this・
pre-reflective・primal・sensibility・has・certain・ethical・gestures・already・rooted・ in・ its・
structure.・Following・Levinas’・ line・of・discussion,・I・will・show・that・ethical・becoming・








phenomenological・ thought・ for・many・decades:・many・ thinkers・offer・a・patient・and・
detailed・analysis・of・the・ethical・encounter,・the・notion・of・ethical・subjectivity,・and・the・
configurations・of・the・self・in・the・ethical・relation・with・another・human・being.・Levinas,・
















this・paper・ is・ to・radicalize・ the・question・of・ethical・subjectivity・before・ it・ is・engaged・
in・ the・ intersubjective・ relation・with・ the・other,・ to・deepen・ the・phenomenological・
description・of・sensuous・subjectivity・and・to・disclose・the・modalities・of・sensibility・that・
influence・ethical・becoming.・
・ My・primary・concern・ is・ to・elaborate・on・pre-reflective・ethical・ subjectivity・
as・ it・ is・presented・ in・Levinas’・philosophy.・However,・ I・believe・ that・ some・of・ the・















・ In・Ideas ・II ・Husserl・ employs・ the・ term・intellectus・ agens ・ to・distinguish・
the・ inner・ layers・of・ the・personality・where・ the・ two・ foundational・ forms・of・primal・
sensibility・are・located:・the・soul-dimension・(seelische),・as・the・‘underground・of・spirit’,1・








it・another・way,・ intentionality・directs・ itself・actively・ towards・sensibility.・Sensibility・
is・presupposed・and・pre-given.・ In・Ideas・II ,・Husserl・notes・ that・ the・pre-given・object・
includes・ the・ range・of・associations,・ senses,・drives,・and・ instincts・ that・define・our・
attitude・ to・ the・object,・and・which・allow・the・subject・ to・ form・judgments,・and・make・
decisions・or・distinctions.・This・ function・of・sensibility・ is・called・ the・“natural・side・of・
spirit”・(Husserl,・1952,・279)・and・it・is・characterized・as・an・active・one.
・ Addressing・ such・ fundamental・works・as・Totality・and・ Infinity ,・Existence ・
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and・Existents ,・and・Otherwise・ than・Being・or・beyond・ the・Essence ,・ it・ is・clear・ that・
Levinas・gleaned・decisive・ insights・ for・his・own・analysis・of・sensibility・ from・Husserl.・
In・ this・ short・overview・of・ sensibility・ in・Husserl’s・project・ I・have・mentioned・ two・
aspects・of・ sensibility:・active・and・passive.・ I・would・argue・ that・ the・active・ layer・of・
sensibility・ is・present・ in・Levinas’・description・of・enjoyment,・ though・ in・a・different・
sense・from・what・we・find・in・Husserl,・while・the・passive・layer・of・sensibility・is・enabled・
in・ the・ intersubjective・relation.・What・ interests・me・ is・how・the・active・and・affective・
dimensions・of・ sensibility・ reveal・a・pre-giveness・of・ the・ethical・ self.・Thus,・my・ first・
















Enjoyment・constitutes・ the・essential・ life・activity・of・ subjectivity:・ sleeping,・eating,・
watching,・touching・and・working・(Levinas,・2004,・111).・Certainly・this・is・a・concern・for・
oneself・and・it・covers・all・other・(ethical)・activities;・the・mode・of・subjectivity’s・life・is・a・











・ 　“The・I・ is・ thus・at・home・with・ itself.・Through・the・home・our・relation・with・
space・as・distance・and・extension・ is・substituted・ for・ the・simple・ “bathing・ in・ the・
elemental.”・But・the・adequate・relation・with・the・element・is・precisely・bathing.・The・
interiority・of・ immersion・is・not・convertible・ into・exteriority.・ …・To・bathe・ in・the・
element・is・to・be・in・an・inside-out・world.”・(Levinas,・2004,・・132)
・ This・“bathing・in・the・elemental”・of・life・itself・is・also・an・affective・experience・
of・being・at・home・ (“chez・soi”)・ in・which・dwelling・manifests・ itself・as・an・enjoyment・
of・ the・materiality・of・ the・world・and・ the・mastering・of・ it.・This・affective・experience・
of・subjectivity・ initiates・subjectivity・ into・a・sensual・embodied・event・ that・ is・grasped・
in・a・ feeling・of・ joy.・ Subjectivity・ relates・ itself・ to・ the・objects・of・ enjoyment;・ it・ is・
sensibility・ that・ forms・ the・exterior・and・ interior・of・ the・self.・ ・Here,・ it・ is・ important・
to・see・enjoyment・as・a・new・form・intentionality.3・Because・ the・sensual・embodiment・




itself・ and・not・ vice・ versa:・ “(t)he・ intentionality・ aiming・at・ the・ exterior・ changes・




・ The・ attitude・ to・ life・ as・ experiencing・ enjoyment・ is・motivated・ by・ the・
principles・of・ life・ itself.・The・experience・of・ enjoyment・ is・ a・momentary・ recovery・
of・ life’s・ forces,・which・ is・very・natural・ for・a・human・being,・as・Levinas・writes,・ “in・
enjoyment・I・am・absolutely・for・my・self”・(Levinas,・2004,・134).・However,・the・sensible・
self・here・has・a・different・meaning.・Enjoyment・described・as・“bathing・in・the・elemental”・
is・ a・pure・ sensibility・ (using・Husserl’ s・ term・primal・ sensibility),・which・does・not・
originate・ from・the・position・of・ the・ I.・The・ego・ is・challenged・or,・ in・other・words,・ is・
melted・ in・enjoyment・without・ intending・any・purpose.・ In・his・analysis・of・enjoyment・
and・the・affective・state・of・sensibility・Levinas・focuses・a・great・deal・of・attention・on・the・
“contraction”・of・ the・sentiment・which・subjectivity・ is・experiencing.・Levinas・writes:・
“(w)hat・ is・ termed・an・affective・state・does・not・have・ the・dull・monotony・of・a・state,・
but・ is・a・vibrant・exaltation・ in・which・dawns・ the・ ・self.・For・ the・ I・ is・not・ the・support・




in・ this・ surprising・description・of・ the・essence・of・enjoyment,・ subjectivity・does・not・
have・any・chance・to・return・to・the・sameness・of・ the・self・ in・ its・consumption・and・the・
satisfaction・of・ its・need.・The・being・of・ subjectivity・ is・constructed・not・only・on・ the・
experience・of・enjoyment,・or・ the・enjoyment・of・enjoyment,・but・ the・I・also・builds・ its・
existence・on・enjoyment・(Levinas,・2004,・134-135).・Building・existence・on・enjoyment・




in・ the・ independence・of・self-sensing・while・enjoying・elemental・ sensations.・Bathing・
in・ the・materiality・of・ the・world,・embodied・subjectivity・arises・ from・the・self-sensing・
of・sensibility,・which・is・gradually・and・in・a・fragile・way・formed・in・enjoyment.・Levinas・











・ The・discussion・ of・ sensible・ subjectivity・ is・ connected・ to・ a・ function・ of・
auto-affectivity・ revealed・ in・ the・ living・present,・which・ is・an・ inherent・component・




I・would・suggest・ that・hunger,・vision・and・ light・ together・reveal・ the・sensing・self,・my・
self,・but・also・the・self・as・openness・to・the・transcendence・of・the・other・human・being.・・
・ The・ first・element・of・ the・being・of・ the・sensible,・which・ in・ the・ face-to-face・
relation・becomes・an・essential・ force・of・ethical・responsibility,・ is,・as・Levinas・puts・ it,・
‘being・hungry’.・The・whole・project・of・ethics・starts・here・from・the・living・subjectivity,・i.e.・
from・the・embodied・hungry・sensibility:・“Only・a・subject・that・eats・can・be・for-the-other”・
(Levinas,・2006,・74).・ In・ its・hunger,・and・constant・search・ for・ the・means・of・ feeding・
itself,・subjectivity・ is・ for・ the・first・ time・disclosed・as・vulnerable.・This・vulnerability・ is・
different・ in・ its・nature・ from・the・vulnerability・provoked・by・the・appeal・of・ the・other.・







but・not,・ initially,・ in・view・of・its・own・existence.・Nor・is・ it・a・representation・of・self・by・
self.・It・is・for・itself・as・in・the・expression・‘each・for・himself’;・for・itself・as・the・‘famished・
stomach・that・has・no・ears’,・capable・of・killing・ for・a・crust・of・bread,・ is・ for・ itself;・ for・
itself・as・ the・surfeited・one・who・does・not・understand・ the・starving・and・approaches・













・ The・desire・ to・ satisfy・hunger・becomes・my・ intention・ and・ is・ rationally・
appropriated・as・mine.・I・am・making・a・choice・under・its・guidance.・The・need・to・satisfy・
is・not・ just・a・ subpersonal・ level・of・me,・but・ is・myself:・ the・hunger・ is・ the・ inside・of・
my・embodiment,・where・getting・ ‘food’,・choosing・what・ I・eat,・ is・an・ identification・of・
what・is・me・and・my・own・inner・sensibility.4・・In・Otherwise・than・Being・or・Beyond・the・
Essence・Levinas ・writes:・“The・taste・is・the・way・a・sensible・subject・becomes・a・volume,・
or・ the・ irreducible・event・ in・which・ the・special・phenomenon・of・biting・becomes・ the・
identification・called・me,・ in・which・ it・becomes・me・through・the・ life・ that・ lives・ from・
its・very・ life・ in・a・frueri・vivendi ”・ (Levinas,・2006,・73).・Subjectivity・creates・ its・own・
volume・or,・in・other・words,・a・sense・of・the・self,・from・the・taste・of・what・it・enjoys.・It・is・












However,・ I・will・also・be・discussing・other・aspects・of・our・visual・ relations・with・ the・
world.
・ Being・embodied・ in・ the・world,・ subjectivity・makes・a・distinction・between・
what・ is・ the・ inner・and・outer・of・ the・self:・“The・I・ in・ the・world・has・an・ inside・and・an・
outside”・ (Levinas,・1978,・39).・The・ thought・ is・ followed・and・provoked・by・vision.5・
In・ “The・Nobility・of・ Sight”,・Hans・ Jonas・ explicates・how・vision・and・ thought・ are・
interrelated・ in・ethics.・There・are・ several・ characteristics・ that・distinguish・vision・
from・the・other・ senses.・As・Jonas・notes,・ “sight・ is・par・excellence・ the・sense・of・ the・
simultaneous....・An・opening・of・ the・eyes,・discloses・a・world・of・co-present・qualities・
spread・out・ in・space,・ranged・ in・depth,・continuing・ into・ indefinite・distance”・ (Jonas,・
2001,・136).・Vision・has・ spatial・and・ temporal・dimensions・ that・ locate・ subjectivity・
in・ the・world.・The・world・ is・co-present,・ together・with・me・and・ for・me.・ “Only・ the・
simultaneous・representation・of・ the・visual・ field・gives・us・coexistence・as・such,・ i.e.,・






in・ the・world・ is・across・a・distance...we・are・separated・ from・objects・by・a・distance,・
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which・ can・ indeed・be・ traversed,・ but・ remains・ a・distance”・ (Levinas,・ 1978,・ 39).・
Distance・provides・a・picture・of・ the・world・as・ready・for-me.・ I・must・not・be・ involved・




・ The・visual・engagement・with・ the・world・ found・ in・ focusing・and・examining・
implies・an・experience・of・choosing.・Here,・we・see・a・specific・ form・of・ freedom.・I・am・
free・to・choose・what・to・focus・on,・and・this・focusing・accents・my・outer・self,・and・then・
filters・ it・ into・an・apprehended・ thought:・ “In・existing,・an・object・exists・ for・someone,・




in・setting・ forward・sensibility・ seems・ to・be・very・close・ to・Merleau-Ponty’s・concept・
of・vision.・Merleau-Ponty・argues・that・vision,・or・the・process・of・looking・at,・ implies・a・
variety・of・viewpoints.・We・are・not・ just・focusing・but,・since・we・do・not・see・an・object・
all・at・once,・we・ try・ to・gather・an・ image・of・ it・as・a・whole.・ In・some・cases・our・body,・
subliminally,・is・moving・from・one・viewpoint・to・another・to・have・a・more・precise・image・







・ Hans・Jonas・adds・ that・ the・connection・of・vision・and・ thinking・happens・at・
the・ level・of・ focusing:・ focusing・and/or・choosing・ something・ in・ the・visual・ field・ is・
intentional・in・its・nature.・Everything・that・is・under・my・focusing・gaze・is・subjected・to・
thought.・The・ freedom・of・choosing・something・excludes・ the・ invisible.・ In・ the・act・of・
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focusing,・I・choose・the・visible・and・ignore・the・invisible・or,・to・use・Levinas’ terminology,・
I・ ignore・absolute・otherness.・ I・would・call・ this・effect・ lensing,・where・subjectivity’s・









as・I・ let・ it・be”・ (Jonas,・2001,・145).・This・ ‘letting・be’・distinguishes・vision・from・touch.・






・ In・Levinas’・ reading・of・ subjectivity,・vision・ is・accompanied・by・ light.・The・
materiality・ of・ the・world・ is・ illuminated・ and・ receives・ its・ existence・only・ in・ the・
light・of・my・bonne・conscience,・or・ in・ the・ light・of・me・being・ in・ the・moment・of・ the・
present:・ “Things・have・a・ form,・are・seen・ in・ the・ light—silhouettes・or・profiles....・As・
silhouette・and・profile・a・ thing・owes・ its・nature・to・a・perspective,・remains・relative・to・
a・point・of・view;・a・thing’s・situation・thus・constitutes・its・being”・ (Levinas,・2004,・140).・
The・Levinasian・concept・of・ light・ is・not・easy・ to・understand:・ it・clarifies・a・structural・
component・of・sensibility・before・ the・event・of・ the・ face-to-face・encounter・but,・as・ I・
interpret・ it,・ it・also・has・a・strong・ethical・emphasis.・He・seems・to・acknowledge・a・bi-
directionality・of・light:・“Light・makes・possible...・this・enveloping・of・the・exterior・by・the・
inward,・which・ is・ the・very・structure・of・ the・cogito・and・of・sense.・Thought・ is・always・
clarity・or・the・dawning・of・a・light.・The・miracle・of・light・is・the・essence・of・thought:・due・
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・ Levinas・makes・an・enigmatic・ remark・ that・ light・ “comes・ from・an・exterior・
already・apprehended”,・which・makes・it・seems・as・if・ it・comes・from・the・apprehended・
world・back・ to・ the・subject・but・ is,・at・ the・same・ time,・ inside・ the・subject,・ inhering・











bathing,・which・might・be・compared・to・ the・touch,・ the・touching・of・ the・untouchable・
without・reducing・it・to・a・pure・cognition.・Seeing・with・light・becomes・visual・welcoming,・
proximity・and・embrace・rather・ than・objective・knowing.・This・ is・a・sensibility・ that・ is・
opened・towards・alterity.・
・ The・ incarnation・of・vision・ in・ sensibility・ is・needed・ in・order・ to・ indicate・
the・spacious・orientation・of・being・present,・ to・get・a・grip・on・time,・and・to・construct・
topologically・what・is・called・my・place・and・my・viewpoint.・Levinas’・strong・emphasis,・
which・makes・his・concept・of・vision・so・different・ from・other・ interpretations,・ is・ that・
in・ the・ case・of・ enjoyment,・ vision,・ as・ a・particular・ form・of・ sensibility,・does・not・
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originate・ from・the・subject;・ rather,・ the・subject・ is・saturated・ in・vision.・The・work・of・
light・illuminates・sensibility・not・only・as・localized・subjectivity,・but・orients・it・towards・
alterity,・enlightening・ the・ inner・and・ the・outer・of・ the・self,・as・well・as・ the・exterior・
of・ subjectivity.・Although・Levinas・does・not・ fully・ enter・ into・a・discussion・of・ the・
conceptual・work・of・light・I・believe・that・light・plays・a・significant・role・in・approaching・
the・question・of・ the・ethical・becoming・of・ the・ self.・While・hunger・and・vision・are・
focused・on・self-presence,・where・subjectivity・holds・on・to・ the・present・and・masters・
its・comfort・zone,・ light・ is・an・enveloping・otherness・ for・subjectivity,・and・gradually・
displaces・ it・ from・ its・ comfort・of・dwelling.・Hunger,・ taste,・vision・and・ light・ shape・






・ As・ I・have・ shown・before,・ from・ the・very・ start・ subjectivity・delineates・ its・
existence・as・a・sensibility・of・self-affection・born・by・the・relation・with・ life・ itself.・This・




as・grounded・ in・auto-affection・ (Henry,・2008).・Similar・ to・Levinas,・Henry・states・ that・
in・being・self-affected・through・the・various・experiences・of・its・sensual・life・subjectivity・
manifests・ itself・as・ sensibility.・The・auto-affection・of・ subjectivity・unfolds・a・purely・
immanent・ feeling・ that・ subjectivity・has・of・ the・concrete・modes・of・ its・ life:・hunger,・








・ The・ conceptual・ background・ for・ reading・ auto-affection・ as・ localizing・
and・punctuating・a・ sensible・embodied・ subjectivity・can・also・be・ found・ in・Henry’s・
interpretation・of・auto-affection.・Giving・phenomenological・analyses・of・ the・moving・
and・sensing・body・Henry・distinguishes・two・senses・of・auto-affection・-・the・strong・sense・




as・passivity,・where・ the・subject・ is・given・ to・ itself.・Bathing・and・participating・ in・ life・




・ Both・Levinas・ and・Henry・point・ out・ that・ in・ its・ integrity・ auto-affection・
discloses・an・interiority・of・the・subject.・Subjectivity・is・born・only・in・the・self-affecting・
state・and・ in・being・passive.・This・pre-reflective・sensibility・ initiated・ in・auto-affection・
provides・a・path・ towards・ the・description・of・dwelling・and・enjoying,・as・well・as・an・
interiorized・and・ localized・subjectivity,・which・ is・a・beginning・ for・ itself・but・ is・also・
an・origin・ for・any・ethical・gesture.・ ・Levinas・writes:・ “What・begins・ to・be・does・not・
exist・before・having・begun,・and・yet・ it・ is・what・does・not・exist・ that・must・ through・
its・beginning・give・birth・ to・ itself,・come・ to・ itself,・without・coming・ from・anywhere.・
Such・is・ the・paradoxical・character・of・beginning・which・is・constitutive・of・an・ instant.・
And・this・should・be・emphasized.・A・beginning・does・not・start・out・of・the・instant・that・












of・subjectivity・designated・as・ the・being・here・of・ the・body,・which・sketches・ its・static・
character:・ in・space・the・subject・ locates・ itself・as・a・center・and・as・a・privileged・locus,・
which・ is・at・ the・ same・ time・a・ localized・body・grasped・ in・experiences・of・being・at・
home・(chez・soi).・Therefore,・ the・self-affecting・subject・ is・a・pure・present,・a・temporal・
punctum・and・a・center・ in・ terms・of・ space・and・ time.・ I・would・go・ further・and・state・
that・by・holding・ its・ locus,・ the・self-affecting・subject・ is・ tending・ towards・a・ temporal・
synchronization・ that・ comforts・ its・ interiorized・dwelling・ in・ the・world.・ ・Here・ I・
emphasize・that・auto-affection・also・reveals・ the・continuity・of・ the・self’s・ inner-time,・a・
protentive・and・retentive・temporalization・of・its・being-in-the-world.・The・natural・need・














・ Describing・ sensibility・as・hunger,・ vision,・ and・ light,・Levinas・ intends・ to・
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1980,・182).・This・project・ involves・ two・aspects・ of・ sensibility:・ the・ sensibility・ of・
enjoyment・before・the・ethical・encounter・and・the・sensibility・found・in・the・face-to-face・
encounter.・In・both・cases・of・sensibility,・sense・bestowal・comes・from・outside・and・the・






contact・but・rather・subjectivity・ is・subordinated・to・ that・with・which・ it・ is・ in・contact.・
Thus,・Levinas’・ innovative・reading・of・sensibility・ tends・ to・see・sensibility・as・alterity・
that・facilitates・our・openness・to・exteriority.・As・Levinas・puts・it:・“This・situation・is・not・
reducible・to・a・representation,・not・even・an・articulate・representation.・It・is・a・question・
of・ the・ sensibility,・which・ is・ the・manner・of・Enjoyment.・ It・ is・when・one・ interprets・
sensibility・as・representation・and・mutilated・thought・that・one・is・compelled・to・invoke・





dimension・of・enjoyment・always・articulates・something・ that・ is・more,・ i.e.・ it・always・
intends・to・go・beyond・and/or・to・approach・transcendence・in・sensibility.・








character・of・ the・ intuitive・experiences・ taking・place・before・any・cognitive・act.・The・
innovation・of・Levinas’・analysis・of・ sensibility・ is・ rooted・ in・ its・openness・ to・alterity.・
His・goal・ is・ to・maintain・otherness・within・ the・structure・of・sensibility.・However,・ this・
openness・involves・being・vulnerable:・sensible・being・is・also・simply・dependent・being,・
being・vulnerable・ in・ its・ sensibility,・because・ in・openness・ towards・ the・world・and・
together・with・enjoyment,・subjectivity・also・experiences・pain・and・suffering,・and・hence・
it・cares・for・its・own・protection・in・but・also・thought・of・the・world.・
・ This・ analysis・ of・ sensibility・ fundamentally・problematizes・ subjectivity.・
Incarnated・sensible・ subjectivity・also・possesses・ the・possibility・of・ signification・ in・
the・sense・of・donation.・The・ immediacy・of・enjoyment・ is・not・brought・ to・ the・ light・
of・knowledge・but・ is・described・as・ sharing・bread・with・ the・other:・ “Sensibility・can・
be・a・vulnerability,・an・exposedness・ to・ the・other・or・a・saying・only・because・ it・ is・an・
enjoyment.・The・passivity・of・wounds,・ the・ “hemorrhage”・of・ the・mouthful・of・bread・
from・the・mouth・that・tastes・in・full・enjoyment”・(Levinas,・2006,・74).・Sharing・my・bread・
with・ the・other・ I・also・keep・my・piece・of・bread・and・ thus・ I・confirm・my・persistence・
in・being・ in・ the・world・and・ I・maintain・my・conatus.
9・ ・However,・ in・ this・ incomplete・












of・matter,・altered・by・ the・ immediacy・of・contact”・ (Levinas,・2006,・74).・The・alterity・
rooted・ in・sensibility・ is・a・prototype・of・another・sensibility・revealed・ in・ the・relation・
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with・the・other・human・being.・At・this・point・of・the・discussion,・enjoyment,・experienced・
as・something・ that・ is・always・more,・presupposes・sharing・and・giving,・and・ it・ is・here,・
following・Levinas’・ line・of・reflection,・ that・sensibility・approaches・the・transcendence・
revealed・in・the・ethical・gesture・for・ the・other.・Thus,・ thanks・to・ its・reverse・structure,・
enjoyment,・ in・ its・ full・materiality,・welcomes・ the・other・without・ reducing・ it・ to・ the・
structure・of・knowledge・or・consciousness.・・
Conclusion
・ To・ conclude,・ I・would・ like・ to・draw・attention・ to・ an・ aspect・ of・ Levinas’ 
analysis・of・sensibility.・Before・the・event・of・the・face-to-face・encounter・with・the・other,・
subjectivity,・in・its・sensibility,・is・explicitly・given・in・terms・of・corporeal・manifestations・
that・orient・ it・ towards・ transcendence.・ Starting・ from・enjoyment・ and・bathing・ in・
the・elemental・of・ life,・Levinas・moves・ to・an・ image・of・ corporeality・ as・an・ethical・
body・ that・ is・vulnerable・and・uncovered・without・dissimulation.・Not・only・ in・being・
hungry,・or・ tasting・bread・ in・ full・enjoyment,・but・also・ in・vision・and・ light,・affective・
subjectivity・ is・able・ to・ share・ its・enjoyment・of・enjoyment・with・ the・other.・Levinas・




an・origin・of・knowledge,・rather・ the・sensible・self・arises・ from・sensibility,・or・ in・other・
words,・subjectivity・ in・enjoyment・ is・animated・by・what・ is・enjoyed,・be・ the・sensible・
itself.・Thus,・the・otherness・inside・sensible・subjectivity・opens・up・the・self・to・the・other・
in・ its・ethical・becoming・ for・ the・other.・This・manifests・ in・ the・sharing・of・enjoyment・
and・ the・ taste・of・materiality・but・also・ in・giving・and・ ‘letting・be’.・ ・This・praxis・shifts・
subjectivity・ from・its・ locus,・ initiated・by・enjoyment,・even・though・ its・conatus・ is・not・






the・richness・of・sensible・ life・and・the・subject’ s・potentiality・of・being・ for・ the・other.・
One・of・the・goals・of・this・paper・was・to・show・the・presence・of・an・open・ethical・horizon・
within・sensibility,・which・ later・would・serve・as・a・ foundation・ for・ the・relation・with・
the・other・person.・・I・would・go・further・and・state・that・this・affective・sensibility・pushes・
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Notes
1 For a more detailed explication see Husserl’ s manuscript L 120, 3b.
2 In Larousse’s dictionary  “jouissance ” is defined as - 1. plasir instense  (intensive pleasure). 2. Libre 
usage, possession d’une chose  (possession of the thing).
3 Drabinski, John. 2001. Sensibility and Singularity. The Problem of Phenomenology in Levinas , State 
University of New York Press, Albany, pp. 114-115.
4 in Phenomenology of the Human Person , Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.254, Robert Sokolowski 
gives an elaborated explication of two levels in the formation of the self. What I want is a subpersonal 
stratum of the self, where the intention is not fully rationalized, but I am still aware of it. What I wish 
is my rationalized intention, which indicates the personal stratum. In the current discussion of sensible 
23 臨床哲学 17号
subjectivity I suggest that hunger, eating and tasting are appropriated as mine, demonstrating the 
existence of a personal embodied stratum.
5 The world appears to be other but it is not the absolute alterity of the other person.
6 In Totality and Infinity  Levinas explains that “If the intentionality of ‘living from’ which is properly 
Enjoyment is not constituted, this is therefore not because an elusive, inconceivable content, 
inconvertible into a meaning of thought, irreducible to the present and consequently unrepresentable, 
would compromise the universality of representation and transcendental methods; it is the very 
movement of constitution that is reversed” (see Levinas, E. Totality and Infinity , translated by 
Alphonso Lingis, Duquesne University Press, 2004, p. 129). The enjoyment of ‘living from’ would 
seek to interrupt and question the transcendental method, which always tends to construct senses in 
representation. In enjoyment constitution is reversed because in self-affectivity the sense of enjoyment 
issues from and is constituted by what is enjoyed. 
7 “L’Archi-intelligibilité appartient au movement interne de la Vie absolue qui s’engendre elle-même, 
n’étant rien d’autre que la façon selon laquelle ce processus d’auto-engendrement s’accomplit. La Vie 
s’engendre elle-même en venat de soi, dans la condition qui est la sienne et qui est celle de s’éprouver 
soi- meme” in Henry, M. Incarnation , Une philosophie de la chair , Paris, Seuil, 2000, p.29.
8 in Passive Syntheses , pp. XXII, paragraph 35.
9 In L’un-pour-l’autre . Levinas et la signification Didier Franck discusses corporeal subjectivity 
structured as one-for-the-other in its enjoyment and its affective sensibility
10 In Otherwise than Being or beyond the Essence  Levinas uses the term ‘denucleation’ to explain that 
the self is removed from its nucleus, as it is denuded.
